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Analytic Inspiration in
Ethnographic Fieldwork
Jaber F. Gubrium and Jame s A . H olstein

Debate over the place of methods and analysis
in ethnographic fieldwork comes and goes.
Some, such as Barney Glaser and Anselm
Strauss (J 967), have advocated ri gorous and
systematic coding, the method entailed
becoming the analytic process (see Thornberg
and Channaz, Chapter II , this volume).
Earlier, Herbert Blumer ( 1969), Everett
Hughes (J 971), and others championed sensitizing concept fannation, which amounted to
working analyticall y in close prox imity to
empirical material and not straying into grand
theorizing. More recently, some have questioned the ultimate empirical grounding of
ethnographic methods and analysis, the
extreme view be ing that these are literary projects (e.g., see Clifford and Marcus, 1986).
This chapter describes a perspective that
places conceptual imagination at the center
of the research process, featuring its transformational qualities for both methods of procedure and analysis. In part, the perspective
follows in the footsteps of Blumer 's,
Hughes's, and others' theoreticall y minimalist proc livities. But it is more attuned to the

epistemological dimensions of ethnographic
engagement, continuall y tracking the refl exivity o f the enterprise (see May and Perry,
Chapter 8, this volume) . The chapter starts
by drawing a stereotypic distinction between
quantitative and qualitative methods and
analytic procedures. The aim is, by way of
contrast, to champion the exceptional theme
that researchers need to move beyond suc h
divisions and their re lated methodological
strictures. Slavish atte ntion to procedure
shackles the imagination. Highlighted instead
is a kind of explanatory excitement not usually addressed in methodological discussions, which we call 'analytic inspiration.'
Some may claim analytic inspiration is
more evident in qualitative than in quantitative research, a view we do not share. Some
have fl agged it themselves by other names,
such as finding analytic ' hooks' or applying
explanatory ' punch. ' Some would resist considering it methodological because it has no
procedural rules. But it is palpable, describable, and holds the keys to understandi ng. It
can change everything, even while none o f
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what it changes can be adjusted to readily
bring it about.
We present three illustrations of how analytic inspiration develops in ethnographic
fieldwork, leaving it to others to illustrate it
for other research traditions. We take the
liberty of using Harry Wolcott's (1999) apt
phrase 'a way of seeing' as a working synonym for analytic inspiration. If Wolcott
applied the term specifically to ethnographic
understanding, it can refer more generally to
imaginings of how the empirical world works
in other research contexts. Analytic inspiration is a way of seeing across the board. It
brings into view what metbods of procedure
cannot do on their own.

Tbe first illustration is taken from our
reading of Lila Abu-Lughod 's (1993) feminist interpretation of Egyptian Bedouin life.
Her empirical work is inspired by a storied
sense of culture, which 'works against' a
widely accepted alternative. The other two
illustrations come from our own organiza-

tional fieldwork , so they will be more personal. Analytic inspiration in tbese cases
works against formal organizational understandings of everyday life, bringing into
view the way organization is socially situated
and interactionally constructed.

MOVING BEYOND PROCEDURE
It is a time-honored saying that qualitative
researcbers analyse their data as they collect
it. This may be contrasted with the quantitati ve proclivity to proceed stepwise; data
collection and data analysis, among other
acti vities, are undertaken sequentially. The

common view is that, first, one conceptual-

izes and hypothesizes something about the
phenomenon in question , such as defining
one's concepts, formulating an argument
about an empirical relationship, and hypothesizing bow one expects the relationship to
appear in the data. The hypothesis is not an
educated guess, but results from careful conceptualization and concise definition. (That
is the ideal anyway.) When this is complete,

data collection proceeds. This second step
does not unravel the concepts, definitions, or
hypotheses. Rather, in quantitative research
this step is taken to provide empirical evidence for 'testing' hypotheses and, by implication, their conceptualizations. The third step is
to consider how the evidence - 'findings' -

accords with what was bypothesized.
Qualitative research, in contrast, is not
sequential. (At least, tbat is the claim.) While
concepts, definitions, and hypotheses are
evident, they are viewed as ' working'
matters - conditional until further notice.
The common view that qualitative researchers proceed by the seats of their pants without concepts, definitions, or hypotheses is
farfetched, a perspective that Blumer (1969)
rebuked decades ago. While qualitative
researchers also conceptualize, define, and

hypothesize, they do so in ongoing relationship with data collection. They entertain
particular concepts, but they do so provisionally until data collection suggests something
different. The same holds for definitions and
bypotbeses. Regardless of how this process
transpires , there is a cultivated tentativeness

about the steps, whicb is the reason why
qualitative researchers habitually refer to
working concepts, working definitions, and
working hypotheses.
It is possible, however, to combine elements of both traditions in ethnographic
research. To the extent procedure is sequential in fieldwork, it approximates the common view of quantitati ve research. Linda

Mitteness and Judith Barker (1994), veterans
of many large-scale field projects, suggest
that a sequential process may be the only
realistic choice when it comes to managing
large data collection teams and navigating
huge data sets. Ethnographers conceptualize,
define, and hypothesize - tentatively or not
- as a way of moving ahead with their work.
The idea that one can proceed without concepts, from the ground up, and derive understandings of how things operate that way,
was not Glaser and Strauss's (1967) sense of
the craft, even if their 'grounded theory'
approach has been formularized this way
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(see Thornberg and Channaz, Chapter II ,
this volume). Allaine Cerwonka and Liisa
Malkki's (2007) portrayal of process and
temporality in ethnographic fieldwork is
closer to practice on this front.'
As a way of moving beyond such methodological distinctions, we take our point of
departure from the need for analytic inspiration, something that would best be continually present during, not just before or after,
the research process. Analytic inspiration not
only provides insight, tentative or otherwise,
but also supplies a roadmap for how to move
along in the research. Inspiration also provides empirical excitement. How exciting,

indeed, it is to see one's empirical material
coalesce in an unexpected or new way, which
is palpable in our illustrations. If representation of this coalescence may have rhetorical
elements, it is not rhetorical in the research
process; it is a constant and eminently useful
ingredient of the craft. Research guided
purely by procedural ru les, sequential or not,
misses the point, which is to provide understanding.' Above ali, analytic inspiration
should not be confined to a separate domain
called ' theory.'

SEEING CULTURE AS NARRATIVE
Our first illustration , taken from AbuLughod's (1993) discussion of fieldwork in
an Egyptian Bedouin settlement, relates to
the adage that life comes to us in the form of
stories. If it is a common expression, it also
has been taken to heart by narrative ethnographers for analytic inspiration. Conceptualization, definition, and hypothesis formation
remain in the mix, but analytic inspiration
serves as a leitmotif in the research process.

It is a strong partner indeed, as Abu-Lugbod
suggests. That life comes to us in the fonn of
stories made the difference in how she 'unsettled' common themes of Arab life in Bedouin
society, especially as they relate to women,
patriarchy, and patrilinearity.
To attend narratively (see Esin et aI.,
Chapter 14, this volume) while observing
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carefully is to pay concerted attention to the
things people say about their inner lives and
social worlds, something that will resonate in
our second and third illustrations. Ethnographic fieldwork is traditionally participatory and observational, but it also bas been
something else - concerned with bow people
themselves account for experience. People
say things about their lives, about others, to
others, if not about them, about their thoughts,
feelings, and actions. They recount their pasts,
describe their presents, and muse over their
futures. They comment on groups, some as
small as families and marriages, some as large
as communities and nations, whether already
part of their lives, in formation, or imagined
in the distant past or foreseeable future .
Much of this talk is story-like, extended
commentary that describes, explains, or dismisses what is thought or figured about matters in question. If what is said comes in the
fonn of mere yeses, noes, uh-huhs, nods of
the head, or other brev ities, these can none-

theless be story-like when embedded in collaboratively designed networks of exchanges.
In the extended interactions observable in
ethnographic fieldwork, the ' small' stories of
mere yeses and uh-huhs located in chains of
interactions can carry the same narrative
weight as the ' bigger' stories told in life history interviews (see Bamberg, 20 12; Gubrium
and Holstein, 2009). As Abu-Lughod suggests about her initially ill-fated pursuit of
Bedouin life stories, to think of stories as
extended accounts of individual lives is to
shortchange the soc ial complexity and
agency of accounts.
Reframed as culturally constructive (see
Winter, Chapter 17, this volume), AbuLughod's interviews offer apt illustration of
how a narrative approach inspired her view of
culture in general and specifically of the place
of women in Bedouin society. As she describes
her conceptualization o f culture, she brings
narrative understanding to the forefront, appreciating cultural nuance. Analytic inspiration
may be drawn from the opposite as well - the
museum view of culture - in which indigenous
meaning is ' fixed' in material and symbolic
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systems of shared meaning. ButAbu-Lughod's
aim is to unsettle cultural generaJizations
marked by expressions such as ' the' culture of
' the' Bedouins, which in her view takes understanding away from the ordinary production of
culture evident in storytelling. She puts it this
way:
a serious problem with generalization is that by
producing the effects of homogeneity. coherence,
and timelessness, it contributes to the creation of

'cultures.' In the process of generalizing from
experiences and conve rsations with a number of
specific people in a community, the anthropologist may flatten out their differences and homogenize them ... . The appearance of a lack of internal differentiation makes it easier to conceive of
groups of people as discrete, bounded entities,
like the 'cultures' of 'the Nuer,' 'the Balinese,' or
'the Awlad "Ali Bedouin, '" populated by generic
cultural beings w ho do this or that and believe
such-and-such. . .. (Therel are good reasons to
consider such entities dangerous fictions and to
argue for what I have called writing against culture. (1993: 9)

Explanatory punch is evident in Abu-Lughod's
eye-opening extended interviews with women.
Of her book Writing Women s Worlds:
Bedouin Stories, Abu-Lughod explains:
This book is intended to present, in the form of a
narrative ethnography made up of these women's
stories and conversations, a general critique of
ethnographic typification .... I decided to explore
how the wonderfully complex stories of the individuals I had come to know in this community in
Egypt might challenge the capacity of anthropological generalizations to render lives, theirs and
others', adequately. (1993: xvi)

As Abu-Lughod presents the women's stories, she is a listener, now procedurally
poised to particularize and unsettle ' five
anthropological themes associated with the
study of women in the Arab world: patrilinealily, polygyny, reproduction, patrilateral
parallel-cousin marriage, and honor and
shame' (1993: xvi-xvii). Referring to the
book 's chapters titled the same way, she
adds, 'Rather than the chapter titles explaining the stories, the stories are meant to
undo the titles' (1993: xvii). Themes such

as patrilineality are not 'just there,' ready
data to be carefully recorded in field notes
and later" systematically described in ethnographic writing as 'the ' kinship system of
Bedouin society,
The thematic unsettling of patrilineality is
especially evident in the stories told by an
old Bedouin woman named Migdim. They
suggest that patrilineal decision-making does
not so much rule the roost, so to speak, as
much as the roost plays an important role in
making that happen. If patrilineality is a
theme of Arab society, it is one articulated
and animated as much by women as it is
instituted by men. The analytic inspiration of
narrative understanding brings this into focus
for Abu-Lughod, unsettling the theme as
women's stories are taken into consideration.
Listen to how Abu-Lughod describes a story
Migdim tells of her 'arranged' marriage to a
gathering of younger women relatives:
One of the most vivid I heard from Migdim was
the tale of how she had resisted marriages her
father had tried to arrange for her. I even heard
more than once, nearly word for word, the same
tale of how she had ended up marrying Jawwad,
the father of her chi ldren. I heard it for the first
time one evening that winter; she told it for the
benefit of he r so ns' wives, Gateefa and Fayga,
and some of her granddaughters.
She explained that the fi rst person w hom she was
to have married was a paterna! first cousin. His
relatives came to her household and con ducted
the negotiations and even went as far as to
slaughter some sheep, the practice that seals the
marriage agreement. But things did not work out.
The time was over fifty years ago, just after the
death of her mother.
' He was a first cousin, and I didn't want him. He
was old and he lived with us. We ate out of the
one bowL His relatives came and slaughtered a
sheep and I started screaming, I started cryi ng. My
father had bought a new gun, a cartridge gun. He
said, "If you don't shut up I'll send you flying with
this gun.'" (1 993: 46-7)

As Migdim continues, she describes the
strategies she used to escape the marriage.
Patrilineality notwithstanding, Migdim
recounts a tale of personal artifice and resistance, which transpires in the face of a sealed
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marriage agreement. Her father and relatives

was located, it was originally one of several

eventually come to an agreement based on

research sites where I'd planned to conduct a
survey of residents' quality of life. At the
time, a person--environment fit model was a
popular analytic scaffold. The idea was that
the fit between resident needs, on the one
hand, and available institutional characteris-

another arrangement ostensibly made
between them , not between them and

Migdim . The story themati zes Migdim's
active participation in the process. The
account also is a vivid lesson for her listeners,
the episodes of which highlight Migdim - a
woman - as a detennining force behind

events. The telling is an unsettling cultural
narrative for the women listening, who stand
to share it agai n with their own daughters and
others. If their own tellings do not reflect or
produce the same results, the tellings nonetheless open their actions to what is possible
in the circumstances.

DISCOVERING SOCIAL WORLDS
The second illustration of analytic inspiration takes us to an urban nurs ing home

called 'Murray Manor.' Here, especially, we
emphasize how analytic inspiration and
methodology go hand in hand. As the illustration unfolds, the idea that expertly planned
and deployed research technique leads to
excellent data is unsettled. The illustration
shows that ana lytic inspiratio n can make a

difference in everything, from understanding, to procedure, to results - to the very
meaning of ' excellent data. ' Accenting what
people do with words shows the analytic
way forward.
One of the authors (Gubrium) conducted
extensive fieldwork at Murray Manor in the
1970s, leading to the publication of the first
book-length ethnography of its kind
(Gubrium, 1997 [1 975]). We will write in the
first person in this section, from Gubrium 's
viewpoint. We will do the same for the third
illustration in the section following, from
James Holstein 's viewpoint on fieldwork in
civil commitment hearings (Holstein, 1993).

tics and resources, on the other, affected resi-

dents ' quality of life. My hypothesis was that
the better the fit, the better the quality of life.
I wrote a federa l grant proposal, but it wasn't
funded . Disappointed, but undaunted, and
using local funds and my own time, I decided
to conduct the survey on a smaller scale in
fewer nursing homes, considerably reducing
the sample size. The Manor was included in
the smaller survey.
I want to emphasize that Murray Manor at
this point in my thinking was a survey
research location, not an ethnographic fi eld
site. The difference is important, because the
methodologies put into place and, as it turned
out, the kind of analytic inspiration available
for understanding the research topic - which
eventually would be transformed - would
dramatically alter my view of data and the
utility of the research findings. I eventually
would learn that a change in or new analytic
inspiration can change everything.
The explanatory advantage of the personenvironment fit model seemed obvious at the
time. It mo ved beyond a simple bivariate
model, in which the characteristics of institutions (one variable) related to the quality of
life (the other variable). The better the nursing home, it was commonly argued, the

higher the residents' quality of life. Instead, I
was inspired by the more complex personenvironment model, in which the fit between
personal and institutional characteristics

(two variables) related to the quality of life
(the third variable). In this model, it was possible, for example, that low resident expectations might not lead some to demand as
much in quali ty as would high resident

Because I was trained as a survey
researcher, it wouldn't be obvious how my

expectations. As such. bomes that were rea-

ethnographic fieldwork at Murray Manor
came about. Along with other nursing homes
in the metropolitan area where the Manor

sonabl y adequate could provide a high quality of life for some residents. (Never mind
the unsavory policy potential of this model.)
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My plan was to conduct interviews with
diverse residents in two or three different
nursing homes, code the personal and residential data for the target variables, and see
how they co-related.
Ironically enough, now on my own and
unhindered by the commitments of grant
funding, [ decided to ' hang around' in a facility, as [ unwittingly referred to it then, to get a
first-hand feel for life in a nursing home. [fmy
gerontological interests kept nursing homes in
view, amazingly I'd never spent much time in
a nursing home nor knew anyone who lived
there. (This can be par for the course among
quantitative researchers.) Several facility
administrators had originally expressed interest in participating in my proposed survey, but
now I wanted to get a sense of life and work
in a nursing home to get my bearings, something more intense than a survey proffered.
The problem was that there was a great deal of
bad press for nursing homes at the time and
administrators were wary of that sort of thing.
Only one of them welcomed me to 'look
around to my heart's content,' and that happened to be the administrator of Murray
Manor, my eventual field site.
[ accepted the opportunity and was introduced to members of what I later called ' top
staff' - the medical director, the director of
nursing, charge nurses on the floors, the dietitian, the social worker, and the activity
director. All talked with pride about the quality of care in the home. Top staff introduced
me to employees [ later called 'floor staff' registered nurses or RNs, licensed practical
nurses or LPNs, and NAs or nurses' aides.
Soon enough, members of the floor staff
introduced me to the patients and residents.
The first floor of the facility was designated
as residential care and those who lived there
were called 'residents.' The other floors of
the Manor were designated for various levels
of skilled care and its residents were called
'patients.' This has cbanged since then; now
all care receivers are called "residents" and
that's what I'll do here.

So [ was all set to hang around, but not mentally prepared to do ethnographic fieldwork.

[ was ensconced in what eventually would
become my field site, but with old analytic
lenses. I figured that the administrator's welcome and the staff's follow-through were
points of departure for what eventually would
be expanded into a quality-of-life survey. In
anticipation of that, I would get to know about
the nursing home as a living environment and
those who worked there as people. I expected
to formulate better survey questions as a result.
An interesting facet of what lay ahead is
the gradual change in the ordinary terms I
used to refer to aspects of my work. The analytic lesson wasn 't apparent at first, and
couldo 't have been, because I needed a different source of inspiration to recognize it.
The terms with which I began, of course,
were part of the language of variables, measurement, indicators, and correlates. When the
Murray Manor research started to become
ethnographic, this gradually turned into the
language of social interaction, meaning, and
representation. The retrospective lesson in
this would be that the working vocabulary
and procedural rules we apply in research
relate to one's form of analytic inspiration
(Gubrium and Holstein, 1997). Terms of reference in research are only as general as the

analytic framework in place.
This was evident in tbe preceding illustration from Abu-Lugbod 's work. She found
herself working against the language of
culture commonplace at the time - one
bereft of narrativity, member agency, and
meaning-making. Instead, she was attracted
to a language built from terms such as social
construction, difference, contention, and
resistance. This altered her method of
procedure - from collecting cultural data to
witnessing its storied production - and
changed the way she chose to represent her
empirical material in publications (see
Gubrium and Holstein, 2009).
But this is getting ahead of the story. Murray Manor wasn't yet a field site and I didn 't
refer to it as such. [ spoke of it as a ' pilot
study' and source of background information
for survey research. [ wasn't doing fieldwork. [ was familiarizing myself with things
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before the real research took off. I wasn't yet
using ethnographic language to describe my
activities, even while I was located in a kind
of field and conducting a form of empirical
work within it. Systematic participant
observation (see Marvasti, Chapter 24, this
volume) was far from my mind. Social
interaction on the premises and the contexts
of meaning-making were, as yet, incidental
to my interests and were, consequently,

undocumented.
In the months ahead I spent listening to,
and speaking with, residents and staff,
I don 't recall having had a grand conversion to an ethnographic view. I f anything,
I slowly eased into what initially was only
a whiff of fieldwork, done for ancillary
purposes. A new analytic framework
emerged only as I started to take notice of,
and to take field notes about, the particular
words and associated meanings that various

groups used to refer to caregiving and the
quality in life. I couldn 't glibly leave my
initial terms of reference behind because I
needed them in order to relate to an informing person- environment literature. But I
did start to catalog ordinary accounts of the
quality of life and their situated points of
reference .

These started to become proper field notes
when I began to think seriously about the
everyday connotations of what I had been
unwittingly treating as background data.
I grew serious about the possibility that there
might be different worlds of meanings apparent in what was said about living and dying
at the Manor. Still, I hesitated to take this
fully on board. My sense was that if my
survey-oriented definitions didn't quite fit
the residents' definitions, for example, that
could be corrected in time. If I found myself
saying to myself and others that 'there are
different worlds of meaning there' that don't
jibe with person-environment fit, I still clung
to the model. Seriousness didn't immediately
prompt a leap in imagination, only troubled
curiosity about empirical complexity.
Here's an example of what I found troubling. One of the ostensible characteristics
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of a good nursing home is the quality of the
staff, especially the floor or front-line staff.
Well-trained and considerate staff members
were viewed as important ingredients of the
quality of care, and presumably affected the
residents ' quality of life. The criterion could
serve to categorize staff members into good
and bad workers, or so I figured at first, and
could be used as one indicator of the environmental part of the person-environment
fit model. What I began to realize as I gathered preliminary ethnographic data - now in
the field - was that good and bad couldn't
be figured in terms of fixed criteria such as
the background or personal characteristics
of the staff. Time and again, I noticed instead
that good and bad grew out of resident- staff
interactions and was a matter of perspective. If, for some, the bad worker was inefficient and didn't conform to established
standards of quality care, the same characteristics could signal good work to a resident who wanted a familiar face to 'stay and
sit for a spell. '
Here's another troubling example. I coined
a catchy term for the activities involved in
keeping the premises neat and orderly and
the residents dressed and tidy. This was the
immediate responsibility of the floor staff.
I called it 'bed-and-body work.' If, to the
residents, 'staying a spell ' and otherwise
being attuned to personal needs signaled
good care, bed-and-body work was equally
significant. Keeping the premises clean and
odor-free, keeping beds made and the Surroundings otherwise attractive, keeping residents' skins and clothing free of bodily waste
were important ingredients of good care for
everyone. According to the top and floor
staffs, families, and those residents who
could care about it, follow-through on this
front surely improved the quality of residential life.
But, here again, leaving it at that proved to
be too simple; it failed to take account of the
interactions and sentiments involved. It

wasn't bed-and-body work as such that differentiated staff, fami ly, and residents' understanding of quality. Rather, the associated
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about the landscape of everyday life, as it
otherwise might be), eventually did the analytic trick . The possible social worlds of the
nursing home (of any organization really)
opened my eyes to an entirely different way
of proceeding. It put into bold relief the idea
that formal organization was something different from social organization, that one
couldn't be readi ly discerned from the other.
The idea that the logic of one was di fferent
than the logic of the other framed my ethnography of Murray Manor. I now understand this as a matter of analytic narrativity,
in which a new way of storying empirical
material changes everything.

sense of Jor whom bed-and-body work was
undertaken made an important difference.
When residents perceived bed-and-body
work such as keeping them clean to be a matter of 'just getting it done' as opposed to
actually ' caring,' it was viewed negatively. It
mattered that all the standard quality-of-care
criteria in this area were perceived as being
doneJor the residents as opposed to 'just getting it done.'
This perspectival stance was the analytic
hook needed to understand the complexity,
which eventually led me to think the previously unthinkable: No set of quality criteria
worked in all circumstances and from all
perspectives. Generalizations (see Maxwell
and Chmiel, Chapter 37, this volume) such as
this helped to move me beyond thinking of
what I was recording as background information and into proper field notes about meaningmaking. Taken together, the notes gathered
from staff, residents, and family interactions
were becoming ethnographic data about
diversity in meaning.
The shift to concerted ethnographic fieldwork required a more complex, dynamic
form of analytic punch. What I was observing
and dutifully recording as field notes needed
the kind of analytic inspiration that would
bring things together into a transportable
argument about the quality of life in human
service organizations. It's one thing to refer to
empirical material as reflecting 'different
worlds of meaning,' it's another matter altogether to start thinking that 'an' organization
such as a nursing home could house different
social worlds constructed out of the ordinary
members ' interactions, which could also

Like many sociologists and graduate students in the 1970s, I was fascinated by animated discussions of the labeling theory of
deviance (see Kitsuse, 1962). The gist of the
labeling argument was that 'residual deviance' such as mental illness was identified
and stabilized by societal reaction (Scheff,
1966); mental illness was as much a matter
of labeling as it was an intrinsic condition.
Some argued that non-psychiatric factors -

transfonn from one occasion to another.

socia l contingencies and structural variahles

It was as much a tum away from the
homogeneity assumption underlying the language and idea of'an' organization, as it was
the plural ' worlds' I was documenting, that
made the difference. Working against the
concept of ' the' organization ostensibly in
place was my way of unsettling the desire to
measure the quality of care. Thinking in
terms of possible worlds, socially organized
together within one facility (or scattered

such as race, gender, social class - were morc
important in determining the likelihood of
being identified and treated as mentally ill
than were psychiatric factors. (See Holstein,
1993, for a synopsis of the controversy.)
[nvoluntary mental hospitalization became
central to the debate because it involved formal procedures whereby mental illness was
determined and reactions to it were explicitly
specified.

DOCUMENTING COLLABORATIVE
CONSTRUCTION
Our third illustration highlights the way analytic inspiration can transfonn one's research
question. Here again, we write in the first
person, this time in Holstein's voice as he
recounts how an a ltered perspective not only
alters the research direction, but in this case
also challenges leading views of the labeling
process.
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When I found myself in a postdoctoral
position at UCLA, Robert Emerson pointed
me to a courtroom in Los Angeles (which I'll
call Metropolitan Court) that handled only
mental health-related cases, including involuntary commitment hearings. My first visit
to the courtroom revealed a striking display
of the process about which I'd read so much.
Florid psychiatric conditions were on full display, as were the side-effects of their remedies.

So were the social processes of labeling and
responding to troubles ~ both psychiatric
and social.
Reading Erving Goffinan (1961), Harold
Garfinkel (1956, 1967), and Robert Emerson
(1969) primed me to see the courtroom as a
stage for the ceremonial moral degradation
and denunciation to which candidate mental
patients were subjected in order to account
for and justify their involuntary commitment.
Sitting in Metropolitan Court, it was hard not
to see 'social forces' operating 'behind the
backs' (and beyond the vision) of courtroom
actors. I was captivated by two questions:
What is going on here? Why do decisions tum
out the way they do? On one hand, the
answers seemed obvious: the social contingencies of troubled and disadvantaged persons appeared to account for their involuntary
commitment. On the other hand, it wasn't
clear how this actually transpired, given the
extraordinary range of factors and troubles
that seemed to characterize each case.
A new analytic inspiration eventually
helped me sort through these matters and
clarified my research focus , ultimately
cbanging my fundamental research questions. As I watched court proceedings, it
dawned on me that there was an important
(perhaps even prior) question that I was not
asking as I watched courtroom proceedings:
How were involuntary comm itment proceedings and decisions socially organized? [t's
not surprising that I should eventually ask
this question, given that I was working in
the sociology department at UCLA, ethnomethodology's hallowed ground. From the
beginning, ethnomethodology has been preoccupied with the hows of social organization
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(see Heritage, 1984). As such, the inspiration
to concentrate on the hows, rather than on the
whats and whys, of court proceedings was
close at hand.
Examples from my field notes and subsequent analysis reveal the difference this
would make. As I began to study Metropolitan Court in earnest, I carefully recorded
notes ~ brief narratives that Emerson et al.
{I 995) call 'jottings' ~ about what was going
on in the hearings. I also recorded jottings of
casual conversations or infonnal interviews [
had with court personnel. At the end of each
day, I would clean up my jottings and write
analytic memos regarding what I observed.
The jottings and memos were fairly substantive at the time, concerned with what I
observed and with the larger pattems of labeling going on in the courtroom. These whats
initially took precedence over the hows of the
matters in view.
Early on, I came across an intriguing
aspect of the hearings that District Attorneys
(DAs) ~ whose job it was to seek involuntary
commitment - called 'letting them hang
themselves.' Several times in briefconversations, DAs indicated that their job was
relatively straightforward. They said that
candidate patients would reveal symptoms of
mental disorder and interactional dysfunction if they were simply allowed to speak
without constraint. Candidate patients would
say something incriminating if they were
allowed to speak their own minds. According
to one DA, this amounted to 'getting them up
there [on the witness stand] and just let them
talk.' The implication was that if candidate
patients were allowed to talk freely, they
would almost invariably 'hang themselves:
or 'do themselves in. ' As one DA stated,
'You let them talk and they hospitalize themselves.' The operational sentiment was candidate patients did this on their own; this was
apparent in their actions if given a chance to
reveal itself.
Tbere did seem to be quite a few instances
of candidate patients ' doing themselves in,'
but was it as simple as that? Drawing from
my field notes and a related analytic memo, I
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can reconstruct how I initially viewed one
particular case involving a candidate patient
I called ' PG,' a white female, perhaps 25- 35
years old, with a long history of psychiatric
treatment. My notes indicate that the DA
began to cross-examine PG with a series of
questions that appeared to explore PG's
'reality orientation' (Do you know where we
are today? Do you know today's date?).
Eventually, PG said that if she were released,
she would go to see people who would help
her ' recharge,' as she put it. The DA asked
her to elaborate, and PG soon made an apparently delusional claim that she received rejuvenating ' power from the life force .' Soon
thereafter, in summarizing his case to the
judge, the DA argued that PG was 'delusional' and she 'lacked the ability to carry out
the most basic tasks of everyday life.' He
explained that PG was unable to focus on the
important matters at hand even though she
knew it was urgent for her to be on her best
behavior. The hearing ended with the judge
declaring that PG was 'gravely disabled' and
' unable to provide for her own upkeep due to
her severe delusions and inability to focus
properly on the important matters at hand.'
One of my analytic memos reads that ' PG
seemed to hang herself. ' My summary jottings indicated that the DA patiently allowed
PG to talk about mundane matters until PG's
delusions emerged. Other notes indicated
that ' PG was under a lot of stress.' She was
'out of her element.' She didn't seem completely in touch with what was going on. The
notes indicated that this may have been due
to the side-effects of medication. I also noted
that everyone else in the hearing was a professional (and male) and they looked the
various parts. PG was dressed in institutional
pajamas. She had been brought directly from
(the State Hospital) to the hearing and wasn't
given the opportunity to make herself ' presentable.' My notes read, ' See Garfinkel,
Goffinan on degradation.' These were some
of my what questions.
Summary jottings also suggested that PO
really didn't know her lawyer (a public
defender) and 'was not adequately prepped'

for her testimony. Additional notes indicated
that she did not have access to the full range
of legar safeguards or resources that might
have been used to prevent her commitment.
The notes suggested that while PO was delusional, multiple 'social contingencies' were
at work, indicating that psychiatric factors
were not the only detenninant in the hearing
outcome. These were why concerns.
Clearly, in tracing what was going on in

this hearing, I was sensitized to the nonpsychiatric (why) factors that could have
influenced the hearing's outcome. The concerns of prior labeling studies were apparent
in the ways I was prepared to account for this
and other hearing outcomes. PO had, indeed,
contributed to her own 'hanging,' and it was
easy to speculate about the myriad social
contingencies that were working against her.
There was a great deal going on here, sociologically, but the complexity of the proceedings made a rigorous empirical explanation
difficult since many possibly influential variables (e.g., social class) were not proximally
apparent. In other instances, key variables
seemed to operate in multiple ways.
My inability to get a grip on this opened
the door to new analytic inspiration, changing the focus from what and why questions to
how the moment-to-moment activities and
realities of the court were interactionally
organized. This would sharpen and narrow
the research focus to what would be immediately visible. As simple as this shift sounds,
its procedural and explanatory implications
were profound. The concrete upshot of the
change was apparent in the very way I conceived of and recorded happenings in the
field. In order to grasp how interactional
matters transpired, I began to pay much
closer attention to social interaction, the turoby-tum dynamics of courtroom talk. This
was not a doctrinaire shift to a conversation
analytic agenda, but it did involve greater
appreciation of the sequential environment
of courtroom talk.
Jottings and summary field notes were insufficient for this type of analysis. Instead, I began
to produce close-to-verbatim ' do-it-yourself'
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transcripts of th e commitment hearings (see
Oubrium and Holstein, 2009; West, 1996).
The procedural shift is evident from a
before-and-after glance at my field notes.
Jottings and detailed summaries were
replaced by imperfect utterance-byutterance records of courtroom talk. The
ini tial drafts o f my notes contained no summary, commentary, or ana lysis (although I
would try to add summary comments afterwards). They w ere merely transcripts to be
closely scrutinized and analysed later for
their socially organized and socially organizing components.
Cons ider, fo r example, th e following
transcript and subsequ ent analysis inspired
by the question of how candidate patients
ended up ' hanging th emselves.' This is a
slig htly revised vers ion of the actua l do-ityourself transcript I captured in my notes. It
was chosen because it parallels the case
described above and clearly illustrates some
of the ways in which the shi ft from what
and why to how questions affects the ethnographic enterprise, in this case shaping what
actuall y was put down on paper and the
rel ated sense of what constituted relevant
field data. Formerly desc riptive notes of
happenings and personal characteristics
(whats) turned into displays of collaborative
constru ction (hows) of the matters formerly
bei ng documented.
Lisa Sellers (LS), an apparently poor black
woman, perhaps 25- 35 years old, illustrates
how what the DAs called' letting them hang
themselves' was collaborative ly accomplished, not j ust personally emergent (see
Holstein, 1993). The do-it-yourself transcript
of the DA's cross-examination in this case
includes a series of 14 direct questions (not
shown here) to which Sellers responded with
brief answers (What's your name? Where are
we right now? Where do you li ve? What day
of the week is it?). This series comprised 14
straightfo rward question- answer pairs. There
were no notable pauses at the end of questions and answers (i.e., possible speakership
transition points), nor were there any intrusions or interruptions of one party by the
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other. At the end of this sequence, the DA
began to pursue a different questioning tack :
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

18.
19.
20.
21 .
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

OA: How do you like summer out here, lisa?
lS: It's OK.
OA: How long have you lived here?
l5: Since I moved from Houston
((Silence)) INote: if unspecified, time is
one to three secondsl
lS: About three years ago
OA: Tell me about why you came here.
lS: I just came
((Silence))
l5: You know, I wanted to see the stars, Hollywood.
((Silence))
OA: Uh huh
l5: I didn't have no money.
((Silence))
lS: I'd like to get a good place to live.
((Silence 5 seconds))
OA: Go on. ((spoken simultaneously with
onset of the next
utterance))
lS: There was some nice things I brought
((Silence))
OA: Uh huh
lS: 8rought them from the rocketship.
OA: Oh really?
lS: They was just some things I had.
OA: From the rocketship?
lS: Right.
OA: Were you on it?
lS: Yeah.
DA: Tell me about this rocketship, lisa.

The sequence culminates in Sellers' seemingly delusional rocketship reference, with
the DA avidly fo llowing up.
The detailed transcript and central question of how Sellers came to ' bang herself'
yielded a signifi cantly different analysis
from that of PO 's hearing above. Differently
inspired, one can make the case that Sellers
did not simply or inevitably blurt oul the
apparently 'delusiona l' rocketship reference
as evidence of some troubled inner state or
mental incompetence. Rather, I was able to
view how the rocketship utterance came into
playas a matter of conversational collaboration and Sellers' related interactional competence (see Holstein, 1993).
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In examtnmg how this exchange was
organized, note that the DA significantly
changed the question and answer pattern that

had emerged as the normative expectation for
the interrogation. After the previous series of
questions that were answerable with short,
factual replies, in line I, the DA now asked an
open-ended question. In his next turn (line 3),
he returned to a more straightfOlward question, but when Sellers produced a candidate
answer (line 4), the DA declined to take the
next turn at talk. A silence emerged following
line 4, where a question from the DA had
previously been forthcoming. The gap in talk
was eventually terminated (line 6) by Sellers'

elaboration of her prior utterance.
In line 7, the DA solicited further talk, but

this time it was not in the form of a question.
Instead, it was a very general prompt for
Sellers to provide more information. The
adequacy of a response to this kind of

request, however, is more indeterminate than
for a direct question. In a sense, the DA put
himself in the position to decide when his
request for information was adequately fulfilled. The adequacy and completeness of
Sellers' response thus depended, in part, on
how the DA acknowledged it.
At line 9, the DA did not respond to Sellers
candidate answer at the first possible opportunity. When silence developed, Sellers elaborated her previous answer (line 10). The DA
did not respond to this utterance either, and
another noteworthy silence ensued. Such

silences signal conversational difficulties,
troubles that implicate the prior speaker, who
typica ll y attempts remedial action. Sellers
did just that by reclaiming speakership and
embellishing a prior utterance on several
occasions (lines 6, 10, 15, and 17). In each
instance, she filled silences with her own
ta lk, all competently accomplished.
Several times, then, in the course of this
conversation, the OA's refusal to take a tum at
talk provoked Sellers to continue her own
turns. At line 12, the OA encouraged this practice by offering a minimal acknowledgement
CUh huh), which implied that an extended
tum at talk was in progress but was not yet

complete. He used this brief tum to subtly
prompt Sellers to continue, which she did (lines
13 and 15). Her responses, however, met only
with silence. At line 17, the OA explicitly
encouraged Sellers to 'Go on,' which she did
by changing the line of talk to focus on 'some
nice things (she) brought' (line 18). The DA
again declined speakership (line 19), then
offered a minimal prompt (line 20), to which
Sellers fmally replied with 'Brought them from
the rocketship' (line 21). This utterance elicited
a strong display of interest from the OA COh
really? ' - line 22), who then actively resumed
questioning Sellers about the rocketship.
The OA's 'Oh really?' was a compelling
display of interest. In the difficult conversational environment that had emerged, it provided a landmark toward which Sellers might
orient her talk. Put differently, it signaled that
the prior utterance was noteworthy, even
newsworthy. Responding to this, Sellers
launched a new, more successful line of talk,
'success' being defined in terms of the ability
to re-establish and sustain a viab le and
dynamic question- answer sequence. in vernacular tenns~ the rocketship statement and
its aftermath helped Sellers keep up her end
of the conversation. But it also helped her 'do
herself in.' In a sense, Lisa Sellers engaged in
practices commonly followed in similar conversational circumstances. She used the rocketship reference to deal with conversational
difficulties and e laborated it to sustain a thriving line of talk. She competently fulfilled her
conversational responsibilities, but, in the
process, displayed her mental incompetence.
Only close examination of the sequential context of conversation makes this evident.
To summarize, in my initial observations
of Metropolitan Court, [ typically looked past
conversational structure (see Toerien,
Chapter 22, this volume) and dynamics,
which were heard but not noticed. This was
the case both procedurally - in the way I took
field notes - and conceptually - in the way I
formulated summaries of the proceedings
with li ttle mention of the interactional dynamics themselves. Initially, the field included
constructs or variables not actually evident in
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the hearing talk but arguably operating at
some other level to shape hearing outcomes.
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apparent punch line, empirical material and
analysis without punch fall flat. We come

But this field did not - as a practical, proce-

away saying, 'Yes, I heard it, but what was

dural, or conceptual matter - include the tumby-tum conversational practices and structures
comprising the hearings themselves. New
analytic inspiration transformed the field at
least partially into the sequential environment
of conversational tum-taking and adjacency
pairs. The analytic mandate now was to
describe in close detail and explain how the
recognizable, orderly, observable interactional regularities of the courtroom proceedings were collaboratively accompl ished, in
situ, not analytically imported.
This transformation of perspectives resembles Abu-Lughod's shift in focu s from merely
describing culture (writ large) to analysing
its narrative production. Hers was also a shift
in emphasis to how questions, inspiring her
to imagine culture in the local telling of stories. Exploring how questions clearly yields
different sorts of reports and analyses than
those emerging when questions of what or
why focus research attention. Sources of
inspiration are key to what can be seen,
heard, described, and reported.

that about?'
In her ethnographic fieldwork, AbuLughod sought cultural understanding. Wbat
opened her eyes to what she had been viewing was imagining herself observing cultural
construction. The same was the case for
Gubrium's pilot survey of the quality of life
in a nursing home. Seeing the quality of life
as a matter of perspective and social sentiments was inspirational in transfonning a
study of assessment into documenting sectors
of meaning. Holstein's analytic impatience
with labeling theory raised critical questions
about the empirical status oflabels, providing
a route to seeing labels in the courtroom as a
matter of collaboratively doing things with
words, not simply being a victim of them.
If analytic inspiration is not straightforwardly procedural, neither is it simply empirical. None of the three ethnographers whose
work we illustrated could have been closer to
what they were studying. Abu-Lughod li ved
in the settlement where she conducted her
observations. Gubrium spent months in various locations in the nursing home he observed.
Holstein was a daily eyewitness to court proceedings. Their respective viewings were
intense and extensive. While concertedly
empirical, it was new ways of seeing that
made a difference. What developed from the
ground up for them was embedded in new
imaginings, not simply discovered in data.
We stated earlier that analytic inspiration
changes everything. A new way of seeing
makes a difference on several levels. The
very nature of what is being observed can
change, the method of data collection is
altered, the relevance of empirical observations is transfonned, and the manner of
reporting findings is altered. If analytic inspiration changes research practice, this is not to
say that being methodical in data collection,
systematic in thinking about empirical material, and accurate in reporting the results no
longer matter. Analytic inspiration is not
license for procedural recklessness. The aim

INSPIRATION AND METHOD
We hope these illustrations have shown how

new ways of seeing can be analytically inspiring and bring punch to ethnographic fieldwork. At we noted, whi le there is no rule of
thumb for inspiration - it is in the nature of the
beast - it is palpable and describable. Inspiration is not procedural in that regard, because it
is not derived methodically. Rather, it is closer
to imagination; it is a leap in perspective that
produces a new way of seeing things otherwise on display before our very own eyes.
Yes, the punch of analytic inspiration is
rhetorical. It persuades as it inspires. But what
it persuades us of is not derived from rhetorical tropes, but rather from the persuasiveness
of insightful understanding, something centered in what comes into view in analytically
satisi'ying ways. Like jokes told without an
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still is systematic, empirically centered understanding. The key question is: Which way
of seeing things provides an inspiring way of
viewing those things? This is not a matter
of doing away with methods, but making
analytic inspiration an integral part of them.

NOTES
1. Glaser and Strauss's (1967) original idea of grounded
theory, presented in their book The Discovery of
Grounded Theory, was a reaction to what at the time
was called 'grand theory,' especially the emphasis on the
verification of theory. While not dismissing verification,
Glaser and Strauss argued for a more balanced view of
the place of theory in social research. They underscored
the need to view theory as a form of abduction , in which
theory formation goes hand in hand with data collection.
which Cerwonka and Malkki (2007) describe as 'tacking'
back and forth between the two in practice. It was not a
particular kind of theory that Glaser and Strauss had in
mind, but rather a perspective on how theory of any kind
should develop and be used in social research .
2. While Glaser and Strauss's (1967) perspective on the place
of theory in social research rewarranted the value of
qualitative research at a time when quantification was
dominant, the perspective was linked with a recipe-like
view of analysis, especially coding, which served to formularize 'discovery' and work against analytic inspiration.
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